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I.

INTRODUCTION

When Cecil the Lion was killed in Zimbabwe by a dentist
from Minnesota, Walter Palmer, social media exploded with disgust
and horror.1 Cecil the Lion achieved an iconic status. In part, the
* Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; SJD, Harvard Law
School; LLB (Hons), The London School of Economics. This article is based on and
expanded from a presentation at the Asian Law Review Symposium, “Combating
International Wildlife Crime: Enforcement, Implementation and Legal Issues” held at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School on February 12, 2016. I am grateful to the
organizers of the symposium and the editors of the Asian Law Review for organizing such
an engaging event.
1 Jani Actman, Cecil the Lion Died One Year Ago—Here’s What’s Happened Since,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 30, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/06/cecilafrican-lion-anniversary-death-trophy-hunting-zimbabwe/, archived at https://perma.cc/
NL8B-HKPH; Christina Capecchi & Katie Rogers, Killer of Cecil the Lion Finds Out That
He Is a Target Now, of Internet Vigilantism, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/us/cecil-the-lion-walter-palmer.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/D5RJ-QM7Q. For a fuller account of the public outcry, see Myanna Dellinger,
Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for Reasons of Public Policy, 41 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 395, 400–03 (2016) (explaining that the public attention and reactions regarding
trophy hunting took place at an unprecedented level).
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protests were driven by shock at the killing of a beautiful and
symbolic animal who was the subject of serious research.2 Among
the social media storm, though, there was also an underlying current:
how could the killing of this magnificent animal, which many people
understood to be endangered, be legal?
Although initial reports suggested aspects of the hunt were
illegal, Zimbabwe’s subsequent actions suggest that the hunt was
legal or mostly legal under Zimbabwe law.3 And the protests and
challenges did not go unanswered. Supporters of hunting and some
conservationists pointed out that trophy hunting is legal in many
countries, that it provides support for local communities who would
otherwise find no value in their wildlife, and that it should be
considered an important tool in our conservation toolbox.4 Although
some of these commentators might acknowledge that the killing of
Cecil the Lion did not fit the ideal model, many believe that protests
of his death were a reaction driven by excess emotion or hypocrisy,
rather than rational conservation thinking or concern for the people
of Zimbabwe.5
This fierce debate about the role of trophy hunting in
conserving endangered species echoes debates in endangered species
conservation generally. Despite differences in the form of legal trade,
these debates all center on the appropriate role of allowing legal trade
in those species, whether by trophy hunting or other means. At stake
2

Cecil was being tracked by a conservation group in the United Kingdom, Oxford’s
Wildlife Conservation Research Unit (“Wildcru”). Actman, supra note 1.
3 Norimitsu Onishi, Zimbabwe Won’t Charge Dentist Who Killed Cecil the Lion, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/africa/zimbabwe-willnot-charge-dentist-who-killed-cecil-the-lion.html, archived at https://perma.cc/C9KH5FLB.
4 Norimitsu Onishi, Outcry for Cecil the Lion Could Undercut Conservation Efforts,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/africa/outcry-forcecil-the-lion-could-undercut-conservation-efforts.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
8YGV-9FMW.
5 Id. (discussing the reaction of conservationists against the public condemnation
toward Cecil’s death); Goodwell Nzou, Opinion, In Zimbabwe, We Don’t Cry for Lions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/in-zimbabwe-we-dontcry-for-lions.html, archived at https://perma.cc/Z9PC-PNVT (“The American tendency to
romanticize animals that have been given actual names and to jump onto a hashtag train has
turned an ordinary situation . . . into what seems to my Zimbabwean eyes an absurdist
circus.”). See also Wadzanai Mhute, Readers on Cecil the Lion, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE
(Aug. 7, 2015, 11:26 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/readers-oncecil-the-lion/, archived at https://perma.cc/3C8P-YZV5 (detailing the contradictory
reactions to Cecil’s death).
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are survival of species, the interests of communities of people living
with the species, big money, and cultural sensitivities.
Perhaps surprisingly to many people, some of the most
endangered species, threatened by international trade because they or
their parts are prized by consumers, are both subject to bans on
international trade and subject to exceptions to those bans. What
effect do these incomplete bans have on the markets for these species
and the species’ chances of survival? These incomplete bans and
their relationship to the uncertainty of markets for endangered species
are the subject of this article.
All sides can acknowledge the tragic loss of a magnificent
patriarchal African lion, without endorsing any retaliation or violence
against Mr. Palmer. Yet beyond that, the sides quickly move to
opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, the true lesson from the
death of Cecil the Lion is more complex and demonstrates that the
arguments need to be carefully weighed, always in context.
Thousands of wild fauna and flora are traded perfectly legally around
the world, with no apparent threat to their long-term survival.
However, for some species, demand from international trade is
driving poaching and leading to critically endangered populations.
For these most endangered species threatened by trade, the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
serves as the mechanism to regulate and potentially end that trade.6
Yet, for many of those most endangered species, CITES creates a
type of dual system referred to in this article as an incomplete ban.
This article examines the arguments surrounding trade in
these species and demonstrates that the incomplete bans discussed
here exacerbate uncertainties in markets for endangered species.
With the level of uncertainty that arises, and the perverse incentives
created by incomplete bans, policy-makers should be highly skeptical
of positions that would allow legal trade of the most in-demand and
endangered species. In practice, these incomplete trade bans
exacerbate complexity and can actually fuel illegal trade to the
ultimate detriment of the species.
This article does not address animal rights or ethical
perspectives that would advocate against hunting or any killing of
6 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES], https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/
eng/disc/CITES-Convention-EN.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3CUM-P6QY.
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wild animals. 7 These perspectives are important, and particularly
relevant for some of the species under discussion, such as the African
elephant, because of what we know about their relationships,
intelligence, and emotional life. However, the article attempts to
engage the arguments of proponents of legal trade on their own terms,
assessing their own arguments, and leaves to one side counterarguments that come at the problem with a different set of values.

II.

THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES (CITES)

CITES, concluded in 1973, is one of the most significant
international conservation treaties, with 183 parties as of September,
2016. Yet it has limited scope and application. It applies only to
species whose survival is threatened by being the subject of
international trade and regulates that international trade. 8 It does
nothing to address threats stemming from habitat loss or other issues.
CITES relies on an appendix system, with listing done by the parties
to the Convention at their regularly held Conferences of the Parties
according to criteria agreed to by the parties.9
Appendix I is for the most endangered species, “all species
threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade.”10
Species listed on Appendix I will be subject to both export and import
permits, both of which require state agencies to make “non-detriment
findings” (NDFs) before allowing export and import.11 NDFs are a
critical part of the process of CITES. States have significant capacity
problems in determining when trade will be subject to NDFs, which
the parties and Secretariat to CITES have begun to try to address in
recent years.12 Nevertheless, these NDFs are key to whether CITES
7

See Dellinger, supra note 1, at 402 (discussing ethical objections to Cecil’s killing).
CITES, supra note 6, art. II.
9 Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II, Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16),
CITES Conference of the Parties, Nov. 18, 1994, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/
eng/res/09/E-Res-09-24R16.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/F859-A97A [hereinafter
Criteria for Listing].
10 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(1).
11
CITES, supra note 6, arts. III(2)(a), III(3)(a).
12 See Non-Detriment Findings, Resolution Conf. 16.7, CITIES Conference of the
Parties, Mar. 14, 2013, https://www.cites.org/eng/res/16/16-07.php, archived at
https://perma.cc/59JT-MDD9 (“RECOGNIZING that, in accordance with Article III and IV
of the Convention, export permits for specimens of species included in Appendices I and II
shall be granted only when a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such
8
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can successfully regulate trade in species so that they do not go
extinct.13
In addition to the requirement for NDFs, the import permit
requires that that “specimen is not to be used for primarily
commercial purposes.”14 As a result of the import permit requirement
that international trade not be for “primarily commercial purposes,”
Appendix I results in an apparent complete ban on international trade
in that species and parts of that species. 15 There are around 630
species of fauna listed on Appendix I, including 300 mammals. 16
There are around 300 plants listed on Appendix I.17
Appendix II applies to all species “which although not
necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless
trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in
order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival.” 18 The
language is intended to catch species that are not currently at risk of
imminent extinction, but that are sufficiently traded across
international borders that such trade could rise to a level incompatible
with their survival. Appendix II also provides for so-called lookalike
species to be added to the list, so that trade in those lookalike species

export will not be detrimental to the survival of the species . . . ); ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE
152–54 (2002) (explaining the process in which several parties had not designated Scientific
Authorities, which likely has “long undermined the implementation of CITES”); Soledad
Aguilar, Regulatory Tools for the Management of Fish and Timber Species Through CITES,
22 RECIEL 281, 283 (2013) (describing capacity problems for developing NDFs); Annecoos
Wiersema, Uncertainty, Precaution, and Adaptive Management in Wildlife Trade, 36 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 375, 403–07 (2015) (stating that in spite of difficulties in effecting compliance
with non-detriment finding requirements, recent measures such as the Resolution Conf. 16.7
on Non-Detriment Findings have tried to improve the capacity of state parties).
13 Aguilar, supra note 12, at 283.
14 CITES, supra note 6, art. III(3)(c).
15 “Primarily commercial purposes” has been defined broadly by the parties. See
Definition of “Primarily Commercial Purposes”, Resolution Conf. 5.10 (Rev. CoP15),
CITIES Conference of the Parties, May 3, 1985, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/
res/all/05/E05-10R15.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4MZ5-HVQN (stating the principles
and examples for assessing whether species in certain transactions are used for primarily
commercial purposes). The treaty exempts non-commercial scientific exchange from these
provisions, species acquired prior to the treaty’s application to that species, and animals or
plants bred in captivity. This latter exception is discussed in the text below. See CITES,
supra note 6, art. VII (discussing exemptions for certain specimens related to trade).
16 The CITES Species, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php (last visited Oct.
12, 2016). These numbers are valid before the Seventeenth CoP, held in September, 2016.
17 Id.
18 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(2)(a).
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does not undermine efforts to protect species needing strict
regulation.19
Once species are listed on Appendix II, they can only be
traded internationally if the state has issued an export permit.20 For
these export permits, the state must again have made NDFs. 21
However, no import permit is required. As a result, there is no
automatic limit on trade for commercial purposes for Appendix II
species and they can be legally traded internationally provided they
are accompanied by an export permit. Around 4,800 species of fauna
are listed on CITES Appendix II, including around 500 mammals.22
Around 25,500 plants are listed on CITES Appendix II.23 Appendix
II, therefore, has over seven times as many species of fauna as are
listed on Appendix I, and around eighty-five times as many species
of plants as are listed on Appendix I.
The quantitative difference between listings on Appendix II
and Appendix I is significant because it demonstrates CITES is not a
trade ban treaty, but rather a treaty that is set up to regulate trade in
species threatened by international trade. The vast majority of the
species listed on Appendix II are traded without major uproar or
social media attention. These species are not the most highly
endangered, or are not primarily threatened by trade, according to
current data at least. 24 Nevertheless, between Appendix I and
Appendix II, there is a middle ground that has emerged in the practice
of the parties to CITES that can cover some of the most iconic and
critically endangered species, and result in incomplete bans in
international trade in them and their parts.
Listing occurs by agreement of the parties and by vote at the
CoPs, held every three years. 25 In substantive terms, listing is
governed by criteria that have been developed by the parties. 26
Listing or movement of a species between Appendices I and II

19

CITES, supra note 6, art. II(2)(b).
CITES, supra note 6, art. IV(2).
21 CITES, supra note 6, art. III(2)(a).
22 The CITES Species, supra note 16.
23
The CITES Species, supra note 16.
24 Listing debates can still be highly contentious. For discussion of recent listing
debates about sharks and polar bears, see Wiersema, supra note 12, at 408–15 (discussing
the listing debates concerning shark and polar bears populations).
25 CITES, supra note 6, art. XI.
26 Criteria for Listing, supra note 9.
20

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss1/5

2016]

INCOMPLETE BANS AND UNCERTAIN MARKETS

71

requires a two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting.27 If
the threshold for listing is reached, species will be listed and all
parties are bound unless they enter a reservation.28 Parties may enter
reservations within ninety days of a listing decision, and they will
then be treated as a non-party for purposes of that species.29 CITES
requires the same paperwork or its equivalent when parties trade with
non-parties as when parties trade with parties.30 Thus, if a state wants
to be truly free of regulation of a listed species, it will need to find a
trading party that is also willing to enter a reservation for that species.
CITES has one additional Appendix, Appendix III, which
operates differently. 31 Appendix III listing does not require
agreement by all the parties to CITES, but allows an individual state
to identify any species “subject to regulation within its jurisdiction
for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as
needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade.”32
Once a species is listed on Appendix III, export from that state will
require an export permit, although no NDFs are required. 33
Importing countries must then monitor the source of that species and
require an export permit if the species originated from the listing
state.34 The export permit must only be issued if the specimen has
not been obtained contrary to the laws of the listing state.35
Thus, although listing on Appendix III does not result in the
requirement of an NDF, the Appendix allows parties to use the
mechanisms of CITES to control trade of a particular species even if
that species has not been listed on either Appendix II or Appendix I.
The Appendix also allows parties to ensure that any domestic
provisions they have in place for protection can be incorporated into
the CITES permitting process. In this sense, Appendix III listing
allows for parties to CITES to impose greater regulatory burdens on
trade in a particular species than the parties have agreed to.

27

CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(1).
CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(1).
29 CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(3).
30 CITES, supra note 6, art. X.
31
See CITES, supra note 6, arts. II(3), V (focusing on the differences applied for
species under Appendix III).
32 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(3).
33 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(2).
34 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(3).
35 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(2)(a).
28
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INCOMPLETE BANS

Incomplete bans are a subset of a dual stream market. When
trade in a species is made subject to regulation, it is subject to a dual
stream market because it can now be traded legally and illegally.
Thus, Appendix II and Appendix III listing create dual stream
markets because listing on either brings with it some regulation of
international trade in that species. The regulation may appear to be a
formality, with a requirement for a document—an export permit in
the case of an Appendix II- or Appendix III-listed species. Even so,
regulating legal trade creates a category of possible non-compliant
trade—illegal trade. Appendix I listing banning commercial trade
does not usually create a dual stream market, except to the extent that
exceptions for scientific exchange could be seen as a legal form of
trade.
Dual stream markets can operate for many species regulated
by CITES with no need to resort to an Appendix I listing and its
accompanying ban on commercial trade. Indeed, some of the most
interesting developments at the last few CoPs involve the listing on
Appendix II of species of timber and fish that are part of a robust
commercial trade so that the parties can better manage that trade.36
Nevertheless, the regulation of dual stream markets requires capacity
and resources to ensure that illegal sources are limited and do not
serve to undermine legal trade. These investments are appropriate
and necessary given that there is no serious suggestion that all legal
international trade in species of wild animals and plants be stopped.
Yet, within the general regulatory needs of dual stream
markets, there is a category of legal trade that raises distinct problems.
These are the incomplete bans I focus on in this article. What makes
these types of dual stream market distinct is that the species is first
treated as warranting a ban on trade. The starting presumption is that
trade must be banned or severely curtailed because of the degree of
threat to the species’ survival from international trade. This can
happen either by listing on Appendix I or by listing on Appendix II
with added restrictions on trade, as we shall see. Then, one or more
narrow exceptions are added, generally by splitting the species or
distinguishing captive-bred populations.
36

Sara F. Oldfield, The Evolving Role of CITES in Regulating the International Timber
Trade, 22 RECIEL 291 (2013); Aguilar, supra note 12 (discussing fish and timber species).
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The use of the word “ban” is important here, because it
demonstrates that these species are subject to some kind of trade ban,
but that the ban is incomplete because there are exceptions. These
exceptions are distinct from exceptions allowing non-commercial
exchange for scientific research because they explicitly allow for
commercially-related trade, and are, therefore, direct exceptions to
limitations on commercial international trade. Thus, these are not
species that are simply the subject of regulatory control through the
export permit process envisioned in Appendix II. When the
exceptions to CITES are relied on, the trade in question is completely
legal under CITES.37
These species are often most at risk because they are iconic:
elephants, rhinoceros, lions, and tigers. Their parts are also in high
demand and, in some sense, also iconic: ivory, rhino horn, lion
trophies and lion bones, and tiger pelts and bones. Others of these
species are less iconic but have parts that are in high demand, such as
pangolin species. The price for rhino horn has recently been
estimated at $60,000 per pound, higher than the price for gold,
diamonds or cocaine.38 The market price for pangolin scales has risen
from $300 to $600 per kilogram in the last eight years in China’s
Yunnan Province and ten-fold in the last five years in Nigeria,
according to a proposal for transfer of African pangolin species to
Appendix I.39
What characterizes these species is a level of demand that is
unsustainable for the populations of the species. Demand may come
from centuries-old traditional uses, but can also stem from newly
advertised uses. In addition, demand for wild species is often the
product of increasing wealth, either because more people can afford
traditionally highly-prized parts or because it can become a form of

37

CITES, supra note 6, art. VII.
Jennifer Harper, $60K a Pound: Illegal Rhino Horn Now Declared More Valuable
than Gold, Diamonds and Cocaine, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2015), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2015/may/17/rhino-horn-considered-cure-all-and-aphrodesiac-now/,
archived at https://perma.cc/BZX4-FTVV.
39
See Seventeenth Meeting of the CITIES Conference of the Parties, Consideration of
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP17 Prop. 12, at 2 (Sept. 24–Oct. 5,
2016), https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-Prop-12.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/L8BQ-W9QP [hereinafter Prop. 12] (proposing the transfer of
four species—Manis tetradactyla, M. tricuspis, M. gigantea, and M. temminckii—from
CITES Appendix II to Appendix I).
38
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conspicuous consumption, as is the case with rhino horn.40 The level
of demand for these species’ parts adds an important dimension to
questions about the role of trade in their conservation.
The clearest form of incomplete ban is when a species is listed
on Appendix I, showing that the parties have considered the threat
from trade to warrant a complete ban on commercial trade. Yet, some
species listed on Appendix I may still be the subject of international
trade. The structure of CITES is significant here.
CITES is structured to assume that a ban is appropriate for the
most threatened species. Although some proponents of allowing
more trade have challenged the validity of this assumption, it is an
assumption embedded within CITES’ text.41 That structure of CITES
means that when a species is listed on Appendix I, a nod is being
made to the underlying assumption that trade is bad. But when an
exception is made, such as split-listing or a captive-breeding program,
a nod is also being made to a view that trade can be good for species.
That’s because these are the species that are most at risk—indeed,
trade has already been determined to be a threat—yet the argument is
that having a market will help them.42
TOM MILLIKEN & JO SHAW, TRAFFIC, THE SOUTH AFRICA—VIET NAM RHINO HORN
TRADE NEXUS 134–36 (2012), http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_mam
mals66.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A2EH-6AF8.
41 See, e.g., Chris Huxley, CITES: The Vision, in ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED
CONVENTION: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CITES, THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 3, 10–11 (Jon
Hutton & Barnabas Dickson eds. 2000) [hereinafter ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED
CONVENTION] (stating that the main goal of CITES is to protect endangered species by setting
up a consistent law and enforcing the restrictions on both imports and exports); R.B. Martin,
When CITES Works and When It Does Not, in ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED
CONVENTION, supra, at 29, 36 (claiming that changes such as “a quota system” after
replacing “the existing system of two appendices” with “a single appendix” of a listing of
“all species of international concern” would make possible a “trade ban on any species.”).
42 The most commonly cited examples where trade appears to have benefited a species
are the Nile Crocodile and the Vicuña. See Jon Hutton & Grahame Webb, Crocodiles: Legal
Trade Snaps Back, in TRADE IN WILDLIFE: REGULATION FOR CONSERVATION 108, 108–18
(Sara Oldfield ed., 2003) (alteration in original) (claiming that “legal trade can displace
illegal trade” rather than “legal trade [leading] to illegal trade”); Ryan R.J. McAllister et al.,
Legalizing Markets and the Consequences for Poaching of Wildlife Species: The Vicuña as
a Case Study, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 120 (2009) (explaining that the creation of an international
market for vicuña can paradoxically assure the species’ sustainable population); Henriette
Kievit, Conservation the Nile Crocodile: Has CITES Helped or Hindered?, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES, THREATENED CONVENTION, supra note 41, at 88, 93 (arguing that the Nile Crocodile
has thrived because of its value as an economic asset for sale of its parts rather than because
of CITES). Cf. John Thorbjarnarson, Crocodile Tears and Skins: International Trade,
Economic Constraints and Limits to the Sustainable Use of Crocodilians, 13 CONSERVATION
40
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This can take a few forms. Some species are listed on
Appendix I, but have sub-populations listed on Appendix II. For
example, the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) is listed on
Appendix I, but populations of the same species in Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are listed on Appendix II.43
These populations are in turn subject to zero export quotas, with
provision for periodic sales between designated countries. 44 This
split listing and unique treatment of the African elephant is the result
of longstanding and bitter disputes about the best way to manage
poaching and demand for ivory, and differences in elephant
population numbers in different regions of Africa. To date, since the
split listing, there have been two sales of ivory between designated
countries, one to Japan in 1999 and one to Japanese and Chinese
accredited traders in 2008.45
Similarly, the White rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum) is
listed on Appendix I, with populations of the sub-species
Ceratotherium simum simum in South Africa and Swaziland listed on
Appendix II. 46 This split listing of certain species embodies an
incomplete ban, because the split in listing is based on geographical
boundaries, not on the particular part or specimen of the species in
demand. Ivory and rhino horn from southern African states are not
different for purposes of their use or consumption; the differences lie
in the politics and conditions of the range states.
For some species listed on Appendix II, the ban on
international trade comes from their treatment on that Appendix.
Some species listed entirely on Appendix II can be considered to be
subject to an incomplete ban because they are subject to stricter
requirements than the text of CITES alone would require for
Appendix II-listed species, the export permit premised on an NDF.
BIOLOGY 465 (1999) (stating that the market for crocodilian skins is cyclical, which makes
conservation and sustainable habitats vulnerable to fluctuations in price).
43 See Checklist of CITES Species, CITES, http://checklist.cites.org/#/en, archived at
https://perma.cc/CVD8-8TC9 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) (containing the official list of
CITES-listed species).
44 Id.
45 Press Release, CITES, Ivory Auctions Raise 15 Million USD for Elephant
Conservation (Nov. 7, 2008), https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2008/081107_ivory.shtml,
archived at https://perma.cc/6BSR-LEU5; Press Release, CITES, CITES Sets Strict
Conditions for Any Possible Future Ivory Sales (Nov. 12, 2002), https://cites.org/
eng/news/pr/2002/021112_ivory_update.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/ADN6-B73C.
46 See Checklist of CITES Species, supra note 43 (providing information on
Ceratotherium simum and Ceratotherium simum simum).
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They may be subject to zero export quotas. Alternatively, annotations
may specify that these species can only be traded for certain purposes,
such as hunting trophies. Hence, they can be said to be subject to an
incomplete ban—no trade is allowed, except in certain circumstances.
Although the text of Appendix II does not specifically advocate for
quotas as a means of managing international trade in these species,
relying instead on NDFs, quotas have become a useful tool for the
parties. These quotas even draw an explicit distinction based on the
specific consumptive use, as with hunting trophies.
Split listing provides another example of this form of
incomplete ban when we focus on the Appendix II-listed populations.
Where there is split listing, the populations listed on Appendix II can
also be considered to be subject to an incomplete ban because, despite
listing on Appendix II, they are subject to stricter requirements than
the text of CITES alone would require. The populations of the
African elephant that are on Appendix II are subject to a zero export
quota, with provision for periodic sales between designated countries.
Populations of the sub-species of White rhinoceros listed on
Appendix II are also subject to limitations on international trade, with
their inclusion on Appendix II “for the exclusive purpose of allowing
international trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable
destinations and hunting trophies.”47 At the Seventeenth CoP in 2016,
Swaziland requested an amendment of this annotation to allow it to
conduct “a limited and regulated trade in white rhino horn which has
been collected in the past from natural deaths, or recovered from
poached Swazi rhino, as well as horn to be harvested in a non-lethal
way from a limited number of white rhino in the future in
Swaziland.”48
CITES also provides that captive-bred populations are not
subject to the same restrictions as wild-caught populations.49 If an
animal or plant species is included in Appendix I, an individual of
that species bred for commercial purposes will be treated as if it were
47

Checklist of CITES Species, supra note 43.
Seventeenth Meeting of the CITES Conference of the Parties, Consideration of
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP17 Prop. 7 (Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 2016),
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-Prop-07.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/KLT3-MHGR. Swaziland had expected South Africa to join its proposal,
but South Africa decided against it after failing to garner international support for the idea.
Id. Although the request failed, the form of the requested notation is illustrative.
49 CITES, supra note 6, art. VII(4).
48
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listed on Appendix II.50 Thus, even species subject to the strongest
limits on international trade under Appendix I, or a species subject to
restrictions under Appendix II, may have populations that are
captive-bred and permitted to be in international trade.
Domestic law also interacts with CITES to create incomplete
bans. Species listed on Appendix I and subject to a ban on
international commercial trade can nevertheless be traded in domestic
markets without implicating CITES. States may choose to close
down their domestic markets, but they often do not. Thus, a species
and its parts that cannot be traded internationally may still be the
subject of commercial activity within a country’s borders without any
violation of law.
On the other side, domestic law may add restrictions to export
through specific requirements related to particular consumptive uses,
such as for trophy hunters, or it may limit imports of specimens even
where export was permitted by the range state. In these instances, the
ban emanates from domestic laws, but the ban does not cover all
international trade and is therefore incomplete. Appendix III listing
can be a way of achieving this dynamic.
Dual markets require regulatory mechanisms that can identify
whether a species or specimen is being traded legally. Legal markets
can be subject to fraud, and laundering, and a range of illegal tactics.
Corruption is also a significant problem.
Incomplete bans raise all these same problems of dual markets,
but also raise a new set of problems. Sometimes, they exacerbate the
problems of dual markets; other times, they create distinct problems
of their own. The question is whether the tension between the
creation of a ban in commercial trade and provisions for some
commercial trade in spite of the ban can co-exist so that the purpose
behind the ban is not undermined. Logically, the justifications can
make sense; for example, some populations of a species do not need
the same level of protection, or trade in species can enhance support
for their conservation. Yet, the uncertainty surrounding markets for
the most endangered species can challenge this logic. Given that we
are dealing here with the most endangered species, we should
scrutinize the arguments carefully.
Incomplete bans are ultimately a compromise position. In this,
they differ significantly from dual stream markets, because the
50

CITES, supra note 6, art. VII(4).
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signals they send to the market are different. Instead of allowing
trade up to a certain point or within certain parameters, incomplete
bans recognize the role of a ban on trade, yet send mixed signals about
the future status of that ban. How, then, do these mixed signals affect
the arguments that support legal trade?51

IV.

UNCERTAIN MARKETS FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES

Some of the most logically compelling arguments for
allowing some trade in certain species and their parts rely on supplyside economic theories.52 Supply-side economists point out that the
cost of items traded on the black market are extremely high and that,
despite the fact that international trade in those items is illegal,
demand appears insatiable. With rhino horn estimated to be among
the highest-valued commodities—higher than gold, diamonds, and
cocaine,53 an institution like the Natural History Museum in London
does not display a real horn on its stuffed rhinoceros exhibit for fear
of theft. If the market in these products is legalized, the argument
goes, supply can be increased and the price will go down. Once the
price goes down, the incentives for poachers will be removed and
poachers and those involved in the illegal trade will move out of the
market.54 These arguments seem so logically compelling that they
can be easily and quickly presented in opinion pieces in the print

51 For additional discussion of the assumptions behind arguments for legal trade in
endangered species, see Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty and Markets for Endangered
Species Under CITES, 22 RECIEL 239, 241–49 (2013) (assessing the economic arguments
of proponents such as demand elasticity for legalizing trade in endangered species under
CITES). For additional discussion of uncertainty in wildlife trade, see Wiersema, supra note
12, at 378–88 (explaining how information gaps along with complexity and indeterminacy
cause uncertainty in deciding whether to legalize trade for species).
52 See, e.g., Duan Biggs et al., Legal Trade of Africa’s Rhino Horns, 339 SCI. 1038
(2013) (arguing that while legal trade would help conservation efforts, a trade ban limits
supply and thus increases prices and poaching,); Kirsten Conrad, Trade Bans: A Perfect
Storm for Poaching? 5 TROPICAL CONSERVATION SCI. 245 (2012) (claiming that trade ban
has not resolved the problem of decline of wild populations for some species).
53 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54
See, e.g., Michael ‘t Sas-Rolfes, Who Will Save the Wild Tiger?, PERC POLICY
SERIES (Feb. 1998), at 1, 10 (“While legal trade could make it easier for illegal traders to
operate, a legal supply could bring down the average market price of tiger products.”); Biggs
et al., supra note 52 (“A legal trade could simultaneously supply horns, fund rhino protection,
and provide an incentive for their sustainable use and long-term survival.”); Conrad, supra
note 52 (stating that legal trade is a viable tactic for conservation).
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media, such as an opinion piece by The Guardian’s well-regarded
Simon Jenkins.55
These supply-side arguments are based on a number of
assumptions. For species subject to incomplete bans, species that are
at the greatest risk from an unsustainable demand, these assumptions
are often questionable, and the predictions based on them are at best
uncertain.
A.

Market Behavior and Speculation

Bulte and Damania have argued that the supply-side model
relied on by many proponents of legalizing trade assumes perfectly
competitive markets.56 However, as Bulte and Damania point out,
markets for endangered species are more appropriately considered to
be run as oligopolies.57 In these markets, it is not clear that creating
a legal supply will result in traders leaving the market. Instead, they
may increase their activity to try to compensate for the lower per-unit
profit made for each specimen due to the newly flooded market.58
This in turn leads to a highly significant problem for
incomplete bans: the possibility of speculation. If traders are aware
that a ban may be temporary and that any ban on commercial trade
may be subject to exceptions, there is an incentive to stockpile either
legally or illegally.59 There may even be an incentive to speed up the
process of extinction in order to ensure a higher price for stockpiled

55 Simon Jenkins, Opinion, If You Really Want to Save the Elephants, Farm Them, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/13/saveelephants-farm-them-ivory-tusks, archived at https://perma.cc/44MC-FJY7.
56 Erwin H. Bulte & Richard Damania, An Economic Assessment of Wildlife Farming
and Conservation, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1222, 1224 (2005).
57 Id. at 1227. See also R. Craig Kirkpatrick & Lucy Emerton, Killing Tigers to Save
Them: Fallacies of the Farming Argument, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 655, 657, 658 (2010)
(“Oligopolistic, illicit organizations control illegal tiger markets through complex smuggling
networks.”); MILLIKEN & SHAW, supra note 40, at 81–82 (summarizing the events that drive
an escalating illicit trade in rhino horns from South Africa to Vietnam).
58 Bulte & Damania, supra note 56, at 1227. Alternatively, traders may move to other
species, creating spillover effects. However, this is less a problem for the species subject to
an incomplete ban, so I do not dwell on it here.
59 See Charles F. Mason, Erwin H. Bulte, & Richard D. Horan, Banking on Extinction:
Endangered Species and Speculation, 28 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 180 (2012) (arguing
that stockpiling in the hopes of extinction is profitable if current speculators are allowed to
collude).
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goods. 60 Arguments that current bans have not worked are
undermined by the fact that we do not have complete bans. We
haven’t tried them because so many of our most endangered and
iconic species are subject to incomplete bans now or the possibility
that the ban will be incomplete in the future.
B.

Substitutability

A second significant assumption is that the legal product will
substitute perfectly for the illegal product or will be in higher demand.
Yet, this is highly context- and species-specific. There is evidence
that some buyers prefer wild-caught over captive-bred species or their
parts, so if legal supply is to come from ranched or captive-bred
species, the legal product may not be substitutable.61
The example from trophy hunting is illustrative here. Cecil
the Lion was shot in unusual circumstances with aspects that raised
legal questions, despite the fact that there are many avenues through
which one can legally shoot an African lion in Zimbabwe or several
other African countries. Evidence from trophy hunting practices
more generally suggests that despite the availability of legal trophy
hunting, the community does not always abide by limits. This goes
to substitutability because it suggests that once a source is legal, it
may no longer hold the same appeal. Indeed, outside of trophy
hunting, buyers may prefer wild specimens because the reason for
demand is itself reliant on the power and iconic status of the wild
animal, as with animal parts used for their supposed aphrodisiac
properties. Thus, legalizing a market will not always satisfy those
who were willing to engage in the illegal market.
The dynamic between trophy hunting of wild African lions
and captive-bred lions adds another layer to the question of
substitutability. Because of the ethical concerns raised by captivebred lion hunts and canned hunts, some trophy hunting operations
have distanced themselves from captive-bred lion hunts in order to
demonstrate that they are not the same.62
60
Id.; Brian Gratwicke et al., The World Can’t Have Wild Tigers and Eat Them, Too,
22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 222, 223 (2008).
61 Gratwicke et al., supra note 60, at 222.
62 P. Lindsey, R. Alexander, G. Balme, N. Midlane, & J. Craig, Possible Relationships
Between the South African Captive-Bred Lion Hunting Industry and the Hunting and
Conservation of Lions Elsewhere in Africa, 42 S. AFR. J. WILDLIFE RES. 11, 20 (2012).
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Conversely, legalizing trade may fuel illegal poaching if the
wild-caught specimens will be cheaper to obtain and therefore can be
sold at a reduced price. Evidence on trade in tiger skins suggests that
captive-bred tiger skins can sell for 1.5–3 times higher than the price
of wild tiger skins. 63 This question of substitutability is then
connected to uncertainty about the costs of producing or maintaining
a legal supply. When advocates of legal trade suggest the sale of
stockpiles, the source may indeed be cheaper than a wild supply.
However, if species are to be captively bred, the cost of maintaining
a legal supply may be higher and poached parts may undercut the
legal market.64
Uncertainty abounds here, and each species will be different.
Abbot and van Kooten have observed that captive-breeding
operations of tigers might produce cheaper products due to
economies of scale.65 However, if this hypothesis is wrong and the
output of tiger farms does not affect the price of wild-caught tigers,
they posit that tiger farming will have no effect on poaching of wild
tigers.66 The actual outcome cannot be predicted with certainty.67
C.

Laundering

Concerns about substitutability are significant. Yet, these
concerns arise where it is possible to distinguish between the legal
and the illegal products. Incomplete bans also create another problem,
which is almost the flip side of the substitutability problem, when it
is difficult or impossible to distinguish between a legally-sourced
product and an illegally-sourced product. In many cases, once a part
has been removed from an animal or the animal removed from its
natural surroundings, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish the

ENVT’L INVESTIGATION AGENCY, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: CHINA’S CLANDESTINE
TIGER TRADE 7 (2013), https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Hidden-inPlain-Sight-med-res.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/72G9-FS5T.
64 Miranda H. Mockrin, Elizabeth L. Bennett & Danielle T. LaBruna, Wildlife Farming:
A Viable Alternative to Hunting in Tropical Forests? 15 (Wildlife Conservation Soc’y,
Working Paper No. 23, 2005).
65
Brant Abbott & G. Cornelis van Kooten, Can Domestication of Wildlife Lead to
Conservation? The Economics of Tiger Farming in China 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 721, 722
(2011).
66 Id. at 723.
67 See id. at 722 (discussing the uncertainty about how poachers and farmers will
behave in response to a legal, farmed supply of wildlife products).
63
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species it has come from, as with pangolin scales.68 If the species is
the same, but one source—a stockpile—is legal, and another—a
poached animal—is illegal, it can be difficult for customs officials to
distinguish the two groups. Tremendous strides have been made with
regard to ivory DNA, so that experts can identify legal and illegal
ivory.69 However, these new techniques cannot be applied across the
board.
When it is hard or impossible to verify the source of a
specimen, laundering becomes a significant problem. Here, the
problem is almost the opposite of substitutability; it is that illegal
products can be moved through the legal market without trace.
Indeed, traders may still be operating in the perfect market posited by
supply-side economists, but they may be addressing the problem
either by being willing to take a reduction in overall profit, or by
increasing their units so that even if the per-unit price has gone down,
their overall profit can be sustained.
This in turn leads to important questions about regulatory
needs and the costs of dual stream markets. To address the possibility
of laundering, a strong enforcement infrastructure is required. Dual
stream markets also require regulatory efforts to ensure that
consumers can distinguish between legal and illegal products.
Laundering problems are exacerbated further by incomplete
bans. In a regular dual stream market, there are likely to be many
legal market actors, all of whom have an incentive to help police the
legal market in order to ensure its continued viability and
sustainability. The cost of entry to the legal side of a dual stream
market may not be negligible—sometimes it is related to family ties
or community membership—but it is likely to be lower than the cost
of entry to the legal component of an incomplete ban. For example,
many sales of stockpiles will involve sale between state entities, and
not include private actors. The exceptions to the ban in an incomplete
ban are limited enough that the cost of entry to legality is likely to be
high. Yet, because an incomplete ban implicitly acknowledges and
then in turn feeds demand for the species and its parts, an illegal
trader—unable to enter the legal market—has an incentive to
68

Prop. 12, supra note 39.
Claudia Dreifus, Samuel K. Wasser, A Scientific Detective Trailing Poachers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/science/samuel-wasser-dnaelephants-ivory.html, archived at https://perma.cc/N2U9-YBWA.
69
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continue to provide an illegal supply. If legal and illegal specimens
are hard or impossible to distinguish, laundering becomes easier.
D.

Demand

Incentives to launder exist only if there is a market and
demand for a species or its parts. Proponents of some legal trade have
argued that demand shows no sign of declining. 70 Further, some
commentators opposed to bans on trade of certain animal parts have
argued that attempts to reduce demand are culturally insensitive
because the uses have a long history of cultural significance. 71
Neither of these is always true. Campaigns to reduce demand for
ivory and shark fins in China have shown some success and demand
for rhino horn in Yemen has dropped dramatically.72 Uses for animal
parts are also not always tied to long histories of culturally significant
use. The highest demand for rhino horn in Viet Nam appears to be
related to a new (unverified) claim that it can cure cancer and as
evidence of new wealth in the form of conspicuous consumption.73
The creation of legal markets can limit the effectiveness of
efforts to reduce demand because it sends mixed signals. Indeed,
because the availability of legal products can destigmatize
consumption, demand will often increase. 74 Incomplete bans are
particularly problematic because the effectiveness of the ban can be
easily undermined by continued or increased demand. Periodic sales
can undermine gradually diminishing demand, and because of the

70 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 52, at 250 (hypothesizing that demand reduction is
probably a “multi-generational process”).
71 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 52, at 250 (observing that some cultures view trade of
some animal parts as part of their tradition or identity).
72 Lucy Vigne & Esmond Martin, Demand for Rhino Horn Declines in Yemen, 47 ORYX
323 (2013); WildAid’s Campaign Helps Reduce Shark Fin Demand, WILDAID (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://www.wildaid.org/news/wildaids-campaign-helps-reduce-shark-fin-demand, archived
at https://perma.cc/MHE6-A4WJ. See also SABRI ZAIN, TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR CHANGE WE
CAN BELIEVE IN: TOWARDS A GLOBAL DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGY FOR TIGERS 2 (2012),
http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_mammals71.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/P8DV-LVPB (discussing the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 have seen large-scale
ivory seizures).
73 MILLIKEN & SHAW, supra note 40, at 134–36.
74 See Carolyn Fischer, The Complex Interaction of Markets for Endangered Species
Products, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 926, 947 (2004) (alteration in original) (“A trade
ban is more likely to be needed when stigma effects . . . are weak and lawful demand is
strong.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

84

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

fear that the ban will be put in place again, may increase demand
during the windows of time when a legal supply is available.
E.

Conservation and Local Communities

Trophy hunting and other legal markets are often seen as a
critical tool to generate both support and revenue for conservation.75
The possibility of revenue from endangered species is important
because poachers frequently poach due to a lack of other economic
opportunities. 76 Local communities often do not benefit from the
conservation of the species.
However, it is unclear that incomplete bans will assist with
either conservation or the welfare of local communities. Dual stream
markets that create opportunities for local communities to enter the
market can add significant support for conservation, as seems to have
been the case with the vicuña.77 However, as discussed above, the
legal markets created where there are incomplete bans are tightly
controlled and may not be recurring. Even if the ability to profit is
opened to more people than the state, as with trophy hunting or
captive-breeding, the opportunities to profit will often go to private
actors who are not necessarily contributing their own profits to local
communities or to conservation efforts. Captive-breeding programs
can operate very far from the native habitat of the wild species,
thereby limiting any gain for the local community in having legal
trade.
Although commentators disagree on the relative merits and
risks of trophy hunting for conservation, they generally acknowledge
the importance of governance and regulatory structure. 78
75 Peter A. Lindsey et al., Trophy Hunting and Conservation in Africa: Problems and
One Potential Solution, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 880, 880–881 (2007). See also Onishi,
supra note 4 (endorsing the necessity of hunting in Africa).
76 Cf. Rosaleen Duffy, Freya A.V. St John, Bram Büscher & Dan Brockington, Toward
a New Understanding of the Links Between Poverty and Illegal Wildlife Hunting, 30
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 14 (2016) (questioning the idea that local communities engage in
illegal wildlife hunting solely due to poverty); Dellinger, supra note 1, at 412–416
(discussing evidence that questions the value of trophy hunting to local communities).
77
McAllister et al., supra note 42.
78 See, e.g., William-Georges Crosmary et al., The Assessment of the Role of Trophy
Hunting in Wildlife Conservation, 18 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 136, 136–37 (2015) (noting
that poor management will damage the sustainability of trophy hunting); Richard B. Harris
et al., Application of the Anthropogenic Allee Effect Model to Trophy Hunting as a
Conservation Tool, 27 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 945, 949–50 (2013) (arguing that

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss1/5

2016]

INCOMPLETE BANS AND UNCERTAIN MARKETS

85

Commentators also generally agree that more study is needed and
more monitoring should be put in place, both of which require
capacity and resources.79 Yet lack of resources can make it hard for
restrictions to be policed and benefits to be adequately shared. In
addition, corruption and mismanagement can lead to significant
problems.80
In addition, the risks from some legal activities for those
species that are subject to incomplete bans are higher because those
species are endangered and populations are at greater risk from
careless killing. Populations of species can go down if hunting
operations are not carefully managed.81 Further, even if the numbers
targeted fall within conservation goals, trophy hunting does not target
animals based on the targets conservation biologists might choose.
Again, the story of Cecil the Lion demonstrates this. Although the
lion pride Cecil headed appears to have recovered,82 it is unlikely that
any conservationist interested in the survival of wild populations of
conservation managers should focus on the critical conservation characteristics such as
corruption and property rights); S.A.J. Selier & E. Di Minin, Commentary, Monitoring
Required for Effective Sustainable Use of Wildlife, 18 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 131, 131–32
(2015) (noting the importance of effective monitoring for wildlife sustainability);
Lindsey et al., supra note 75, at 882 (concluding that the mismanagement of governments
and operators is a significant threat to conservation).
79 See, e.g., R. Buckley & A. Mossaz, Hunting Tourism and Animal Conservation, 18
ANIMAL CONSERVATION 133, 133–34 (2015) (acknowledging that a single case study is
insufficient); Harris et al., supra note 78 ( “Those interested in the interaction between trophy
hunting and conservation should question models that fail to capture important elements on
the systems in question.”); Selier & Di Minin, supra note 78 (“However, in order to
understand the consequences of management activities such as trophy hunting and to
implement an adaptive quota system, based on population trends, long-term monitoring is
essential.”).
80 CRAIG PACKER, LIONS IN THE BALANCE: MAN-EATERS, MANES, AND MEN WITH GUNS
(2015); Elizabeth L. Bennett, Legal Ivory Trade in a Corrupt World and Its Impact on
African Elephant Populations, 29 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 54, 56–58 (2014). See also
DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, MISSING THE
MARK: AFRICAN TROPHY HUNTING FAILS TO SHOW CONSISTENT BENEFITS (June 13, 2016),
http://democrats-naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Missing%20the%20Mark.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/GAG4-DVAB (concluding that conservation efforts have been
marred by corruption in certain regions); Jada F. Smith, Trophy Hunting Fees Do Little to
Help Threatened Species, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/trophy-hunting-fees-do-little-to-help-threatenedspecies-report-says.html, archived at https://perma.cc/JU3C-EV3B (explaining the
significance of the Democratic Staff’s House report, “Missing the Mark,” in relation to the
killing of Cecil in Zimbabwe).
81 C. Packer, H. Brink et al., Effects of Trophy Hunting on Lion and Leopard
Populations in Tanzania, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 142, 151 (2010).
82 Actman, supra note 1.
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the African lion would have advocated that Cecil be shot. In species
that are not at such risk of extinction, selection through hunting may
change the species, but the effects may take longer or may be less
significant because the species itself is able to breed and replenish.
In species that are endangered, hunting without careful conservation
parameters can significantly change and potentially harm the
species.83
A similar concern can arise for captive-breeding and ranching
programs, particularly if those programs are designed for commercial
gain. Breeding species domestically can change those species,
sometimes intentionally, so that certain traits are highlighted and
augmented—picture a scenario where rhino ranching is successful
and the goal becomes to breed rhinos that grow horns quickly and
perhaps even rhinos that are not difficult when it comes time to
dehorn them. This could result in a very different rhino population
from the one we have now. While this could be preferable to
extinction of the species completely, it is an important consideration
when wild populations are low.

V.

CONCLUSION: THE DIFFICULTY OF INCOMPLETE
BANS

As we have seen, incomplete bans can exacerbate the
uncertainty already inherent in regulating dual stream markets. This
is in part because they involve already severely endangered species
for whom there is unsustainable demand. Incomplete bans cannot
open the market up completely, because that would be too risky in
such an unsustainable market. Yet, on the other side, they do not
allow for the effects of a complete ban, including the possibility of a
dramatic reduction in demand, to work. As such, they are a risky
proposition.
One possible response would be to pursue incomplete bans
because of the promise they offer, while being aware that they will
require stronger regulatory efforts than normal dual stream markets.
However, this requires adequate funding of these stronger regulatory
efforts to counter the continued demand, laundering, and corruption,
while still ensuring good conservation. This will be easier in some
83

See Dellinger, supra note 1, at 408–09 (discussing potential ecological and speciessurvival problems arising from killing by hunting).
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places than others, and even then will require intensive focus. 84
While the story of Cecil the Lion may demonstrate only that one man
can kill one iconic lion, it serves as an important reminder than the
existence of legal sources for our most endangered and sought-after
species creates pathways for unmonitored killing that does not
contribute to overall conservation of the species.
The arguments raised here have been raised at a high level of
generality. Every conservation decision should be made carefully,
with regard to the species, and in context. Where a species has met
the threshold requiring a level of protection under CITES that
amounts to a ban on trade, under either Appendix I or Appendix II,
more predictability is needed before exceptions are imposed to that
ban. For the most endangered species, we should be wary of
incomplete bans that exacerbate already unpredictable and uncertain
market dynamics.

84

PACKER, supra note 80; Bennett, supra note 80.
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